
# Border to Coast Emerging Markets Equity Fund





# Proxy Voting Report

Period: January 01, 2019 - March 31, 2019

| Votes Cast | 153 | Number of Meetings | 20  |
|------------|-----|--------------------|-----|
|            |     |                    |     |
| For        | 114 | With Management    | 113 |
| Withold    | 0   | Against Management | 24  |
| Abstain    | 0   | Other              | 16  |
| Against    | 39  |                    |     |
| Other      | 0   |                    |     |
|            |     |                    |     |
| Total      | 153 | Total              | 153 |

In 11 (55%) out of 20 meetings we have cast one or more votes against management recommendation.

### General Highlights

#### Gender Diversity: Balancing Out the Scales

Research shows that a gender-balanced workforce positively supports corporate performance in relation to either the company's profitability, risk reduction, or share price. A gender diverse workforce at all levels of the organization can support business and financial performance while improving human capital management. Gender diversity has become a very relevant topic in the international corporate governance arena. A Spencer Stuart survey found that in 2018, 40% of incoming directors on S&P 500 boards were women. This has translated into an overall female representation of 24% across S&P 500 boards, up 2% from the previous year.

In several markets, it is common to include nominations to the board of directors in shareholder meeting agendas. Before casting our votes, a thorough assessment of the overall board diversity in terms of tenure, skills, gender and external commitments is conducted, and compared to local best practices. Key expectations towards companies include increasing the disclosures related to gender diversity throughout the workforce, equal remuneration practices, and disclosure of how gender diversity is approached at the board level. However, commitments put forward by companies to enhance diversity are not always followed by concrete policies.

Insufficient disclosure has, as a result, been the topic of shareholder resolutions filed at companies' AGMs, seeking enhanced disclosures on both female workforce representation at different job levels and equal remuneration opportunities. We believe that addressing these topics would support companies to better attract and retain talent while enhancing the value of their human capital.

In the last couple of years, an increasing amount of gender-related shareholder resolutions have been filed, predominantly in the US. The content of these resolutions ranges from requesting companies to issue either a gender pay gap or employment diversity report to enhance diversity at the board level. Receiving on average 28% of votes in favor, it sends a clear signal to the company regarding the relevance of the topic for a large proportion of shareholders and creates an incentive to address the topic. The rationale behind such proposals is that enhanced disclosures on gender diversity within the workforce would benefit shareholders, as failure to address these matters could present significant legal, reputational, and talent-retention concerns for companies.

### Market Highlights

#### Corporate Governance Update: China and Hong Kong

In China, one of the most pressing corporate governance concerns is the level of transparency and disclosure provided by publicly listed companies. With the growing influence of Party Committees (PC), the decision-making process at Boards is becoming more opaque. A Party Committee consists of members who oversee the board and are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The long-term effect of a PC on board independence is relatively unclear. In some cases, the PC is the highest decision-making body, whereas in other instances the PC is a means to uphold corporate interests for the government. In state owned enterprises, PCs can have the final say on material issues for the company. PCs are less common in private and foreign-owned companies, but the pressure to form them is increasing. The issue remains that little if any disclosure is given on how the PC operates, making it difficult for foreign investors to assess board quality. Although the government contends that party committees will improve corporate governance, many investors remain skeptical.

While Hong Kong can be considered a regional frontrunner in corporate governance, it can also be the first to encounter new corporate governance issues. One such issue is the introduction of dual-class share (DCS) listings on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. A company with DCS can offer shares with different voting rights, allowing the company or other shareholder to retain control despite being publicly listed. In Hong Kong, the difference in voting rights between share classes cannot exceed 10:1. Nonetheless, many institutional investors including Robeco, are opposed to dual-class shares as they limit the influence of minority shareholders.

DCS is commonly employed by companies in the technology industry, which are what the HKSE hopes to attract. However, since it was introduced in 2017, the number of newly listed DCS companies in Hong Kong has been underwhelming and the promise that DCS would create a new home for technology giants has yet to be delivered.

## Votes Against Management

In the following instance, Border to Coast Pension Partnership voted against the reccomendation of management at the shareholder meeting. In each instance where a vote against management has been cast, the rational for the vote is also provided.

| Issuer Name                                     | Meeting<br>Date | Proposal Description                                     | Management<br>Recommendation | Vote<br>Decision | With Or Against<br>Management | Vote Note   | Meeting<br>Type |
|---|-----------------|--|------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---|-----------------|
| Bank of China Ltd.                              | 1/4/2019        | Authority to Issue Shares w/o<br>Preemptive Rights       | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | Issue price discount not disclosed; Excessive issuance  | Special         |
| Bank of China Ltd.                              | 1/4/2019        | Elect WU Fulin   | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The nominee serves on a large Company, is not independent, and the board lacks sufficient independence.       | Special         |
| Bank of China Ltd.                              | 1/4/2019        | Elect LIN Jingzhen                                       | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The nominee serves on a large Company, is not independent, and the board lacks sufficient independence.       | Special         |
| Aberdeen Standard<br>Asia Focus Plc             | 1/16/2019       | Appointment of Auditor and<br>Authority to Set Fees      | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | Excessive non-audit fees for the past 3 years.  | Annual          |
| Infosys Ltd                                     | 3/12/2019       | Elect Kiran Mazumdar Shaw                                | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | Serves on too many boards   | Other           |
| Infosys Ltd                                     | 3/12/2019       | Elect Kiran Mazumdar Shaw                                | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The director serves on too many external boards   | Special         |
| Wal-mart de Mexico<br>S A B de C V              | 3/21/2019       | Statutory Reports  | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Wal-mart de Mexico<br>S A B de C V              | 3/21/2019       | Consolidated Financial<br>Statements                     | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Wal-mart de Mexico<br>S A B de C V              | 3/21/2019       | Election of Directors; Election of Committee Chair; Fees | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Fomento Economico<br>Mexicano S.A.B. de<br>C.V. | 3/22/2019       | Accounts and Reports                                     | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Fomento Economico<br>Mexicano S.A.B. de<br>C.V. | 3/22/2019       | Authority to Repurchase Shares                           | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Fomento Economico<br>Mexicano S.A.B. de<br>C.V. | 3/22/2019       | Election of Directors; Fees                              | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| Fomento Economico<br>Mexicano S.A.B. de<br>C.V. | 3/22/2019       | Election of Board Committee<br>Members; Fees             | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The company has not provided sufficient information.  | Ordinary        |
| The Siam Cement Public Company Limited          | 3/27/2019       | Elect Thumnithi Wanichthanom                             | For                          | Against          | Against<br>Management         | The nominee is a newly appointed director, serves on a large company, is not independent, and the board lacks | Annual          |

| The Siam Cement                                    | 3/27/2019 | Appointment of Auditor and                                     | For | Against | Against               | sufficient independence. The nominee serves on the<br>Nominating Committee that lacks sufficient independence.<br>Audit fees are excessive.  | Annual   |
|--|-----------|--|-----|---------|-----------------------|--|----------|
| Public Company<br>Limited                          | .,,       | Authority to Set Fees  |     |         | Management            |  |          |
| The Siam Cement<br>Public Company<br>Limited       | 3/27/2019 | Directors' Fees  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Excessive Bonus compared to market peers   | Annual   |
| Cemex S.A.B. De C.V.                               | 3/28/2019 | Merger by Absorption   | For | Against | Against<br>Management | The company has not provided sufficient information.   | Special  |
| Advanced Info<br>Service Public<br>Company Limited | 3/28/2019 | Appointment of Auditor and<br>Authority to Set Fees            | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Audit fees are excessive.  | Annual   |
| Advanced Info<br>Service Public<br>Company Limited | 3/28/2019 | Elect Surasak Vajasit  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | The nominee serves on the Nominating Committee that lacks sufficient independence. The nominee serves on the Audit Committee that lacks sufficient independence. Serves on too many boards | Annual   |
| Advanced Info<br>Service Public<br>Company Limited | 3/28/2019 | Elect Anek Pana-Apichon  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Serves on too many boards  | Annual   |
| Advanced Info<br>Service Public<br>Company Limited | 3/28/2019 | Directors' Fees  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Excessive Bonus  | Annual   |
| Advanced Info<br>Service Public<br>Company Limited | 3/28/2019 | Transaction of Other Business                                  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Granting unfettered discretion is unwise   | Annual   |
| TIM Participacoes<br>S.A.                          | 3/28/2019 | Remuneration Policy  | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Plan does not disclose performance targets. The company has not disclosed a maximum award level.   | Annual   |
| Cemex S.A.B. De C.V.                               | 3/28/2019 | Election of Directors; Election of Committee Members and Chair | For | Against | Against<br>Management | Board is not sufficiently independent; Other governance concerns   | Ordinary |

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